<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>crowmoor.se</title>
	<atom:link href="http://crowmoor.se/blog/?feed=rss2" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://crowmoor.se/blog</link>
	<description>by Jesper Kråkhede, Sweden</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Thu, 03 May 2012 17:05:47 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.2</generator>
		<item>
		<title>L4</title>
		<link>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=436</link>
		<comments>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=436#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Apr 2012 08:12:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jesper Kråkhede</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Compliance]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=436</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[So you are a level 4 merchant and think PCI DSS is nothing you need to worry about? Think again! Lately attacks have moved from the bigger targets to smaller L3 and L4 merchants, mainly because they haven´t focused on security to the same extent as a larger organisation has. This means that even if [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>So you are a level 4 merchant and think PCI DSS is nothing you need to worry about? Think again! Lately attacks have moved from the bigger targets to smaller L3 and L4 merchants, mainly because they haven´t focused on security to the same extent as a larger organisation has. This means that even if they need to hit 50 targets to get a decent amount of credit cards the work involved is often just a fraction compared what is needed for a bigger target. Furthermore the credit cards have a longer time to live as a L4 merchant seldom has the capability to either detect or investigate a breach. </p>
<p>And to be clear about it: All PCI DSS requirement apply, even if you are a L4. It is just how you prove it that differs.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?feed=rss2&#038;p=436</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Security and high costs</title>
		<link>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=450</link>
		<comments>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=450#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 29 Apr 2012 09:45:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jesper Kråkhede</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Business]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Methodology]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=450</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Many of us have seen and implemented different kind of security solutions. Some very cheap and others…more costly. One thing I teach all my colleagues, using Security Analysis Framework, is how to calculate the most economically viable solution for our client. It may seem to be rather easily using Return Of Security Investment (ROSI), but [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Many of us have seen and implemented different kind of security solutions. Some very cheap and others…more costly. One thing I teach all my colleagues, using <a href="http://www.coresafe.se/index.php/security-analysis-framework">Security Analysis Framework</a>, is how to calculate the most economically viable solution for our client. It may seem to be rather easily using Return Of Security Investment (ROSI), but it is interesting to see how business understanding affects the cost. During one assignment I showed the methods for the QSA. They did the calculations and ended up with a cost of €12M. The report was sound and good but didn´t take into account the possibility for structural changes at the client. So I took another approach and ended up with a project cost of €4M mostly because I started to question if a new system would be a better approach and in the same time outsource a function within marketing.</p>
<p>So security and compliance is not only about understanding the standard, it is about putting it into the context of the client and find the best fit. Something a security expert seldom can do but something a security architect with large business acumen could. <img src='http://crowmoor.se/blog/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':-)' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?feed=rss2&#038;p=450</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>The compliance market</title>
		<link>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=448</link>
		<comments>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=448#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 31 Mar 2012 09:12:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jesper Kråkhede</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Business]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Compliance]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=448</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[A known and mostly accepted axiom in security is that the people doing something should not verify and accredit the same. This is to make sure that a solution is not flawed or intentionally sabotaged. This process holds true in many cases but as it turned out this is not always true for the market [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A known and mostly accepted axiom in security is that the people doing something should not verify and accredit the same. This is to make sure that a solution is not flawed or intentionally sabotaged. This process holds true in many cases but as it turned out this is not always true for the market of compliance. Take PCI DSS compliance scheme. It is mandated by the card brands, enforced by the banks and verified by the QSA. Nothing wrong here! The merchants have to make sure that they are compliant and do whatever they need to do. Here comes the shady part. How should they know what to do? They ask someone who knows…the QSAs. So here we are in a situation that a QSA could suggest, implement AND verify a solution!</p>
<p>I´m fully aware that many companies are good and hold the security standard high but there are also quite a few that isn´t. Many of my clients sadly bear witness of that.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?feed=rss2&#038;p=448</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Psychology of Computer Forensics</title>
		<link>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=440</link>
		<comments>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=440#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Mar 2012 09:59:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jesper Kråkhede</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Computer Forensics]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=440</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Now and then I´m engaged to conduct computer forensics as part of a sensitive and rough investigation. Even if the primary purpose is to find evidence (or prove innocence) you will inevitable get to know the owner of the computer. I sometimes get involved in fraud investigations, CSA (child sex abuse) or intellectual property theft [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Now and then I´m engaged to conduct computer forensics as part of a sensitive and rough investigation. Even if the primary purpose is to find evidence (or prove innocence) you will inevitable get to know the owner of the computer. </p>
<p>I sometimes get involved in fraud investigations, CSA (child sex abuse) or intellectual property theft where proving the crime is a rather simple process. Still I need to read hundreds of e-mails, look at thousands of photos and in general take a really long peek into a person’s life. When discussing with my fellow investigators most of them tell me that ‘getting to know’ a person that we prove to be criminal sometimes is the hardest part. Along with CSA you could find pictures of family vacations, loving mails from their spouse or just in general get to know the relationships the person have with all friends. It takes its toll on you to still be able to focus on the investigation knowing that your report will destroy the person’s life.</p>
<p>Sometimes it is even worse to conduct computer forensics when you have to investigate a colleague’s computer. I know that it could be expensive to hire a professional investigator but sometimes it is worth the cost. You need to be able to live with yourself.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?feed=rss2&#038;p=440</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Using attack trees and micro risks to measure risks</title>
		<link>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=424</link>
		<comments>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=424#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Feb 2012 09:25:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jesper Kråkhede</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Methodology]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=424</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[If you have been with me the last years you probably know that I´m no fan of probability when it comes to risk analysis. Following this I invented a workshop methodology named Micro Risks a few years back. During the last weeks I have merged this with Bruce Schneier´s Attack Trees and put together a [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If you have been with me the last years you probably know that I´m no fan of probability when it comes to risk analysis. Following this I invented a workshop methodology named Micro Risks a few years back. During the last weeks I have merged this with Bruce Schneier´s <a href="http://www.schneier.com/paper-attacktrees-ddj-ft.html">Attack Trees</a> and put together a methodology to visualise risk and to measure risks based on the impact.</p>
<p>The strength of using this methodology is that you get a quantifiable way of measure the effectiveness of your security mechanism. This could be done either by making sure that all steps in your attack tree are blocked or by measuring how many steps a single mechanism actually blocks. Both of them are usable to provide a measure of effectiveness. </p>
<p>A word of warning! Those figures should ONLY be used as a way to select between different mechanisms that blocks the same steps, not as a way to select to block certain steps but not others.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?feed=rss2&#038;p=424</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>You3 next level</title>
		<link>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=427</link>
		<comments>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=427#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 23 Feb 2012 10:11:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jesper Kråkhede</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Methodology]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=427</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[You may probably have heard of You3 analysis model before. It used to be just a nice graphical tool for presentation of risks but the last two weeks I have spent some time to actually create an analysis model where the outcome is something very similar to the presentation model. Using it as a way [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You may probably have heard of You3 analysis model before. It used to be just a nice graphical tool for presentation of risks but the last two weeks I have spent some time to actually create an analysis model where the outcome is something very similar to the presentation model.</p>
<p><img src="http://crowmoor.se/blog/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/You3.jpg" alt="You3" /></p>
<p>Using it as a way of describing risks is all well and good but using it to analyse risks and map security mechanisms and impact is something completely new. A common flaw in security is the lack of understanding when a security mechanism actually is active and when it is not. A simple example is hard drive encryption that is active only when the computer is turned off. So if you run a 24/7 business why would you then invest in such a mechanism? </p>
<p>It all falls back to the risk analysis and the understanding of who the culprits are (internal or external). Mapping the actors towards You3 helps you have a sound discussion with any type of security vendor and actually make sure that your money is spent on effective tools rather than something you already have paid for twice.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?feed=rss2&#038;p=427</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>BCM as a service</title>
		<link>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=422</link>
		<comments>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=422#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 22:59:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jesper Kråkhede</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Compliance]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=422</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I got quite a few responses regarding PCI DSS as a service, some interesting, some rather insulting from other security consultants. Apparently ‘Survival of the fittest’ is not mandatory literature anymore. Looking at the possibilities of Compliance as a service I started to look at BCM, Business Contingency Management. One of my colleagues, Hans Hjertsäll, [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I got quite a few responses regarding PCI DSS as a service, some interesting, some rather insulting from other security consultants. Apparently ‘Survival of the fittest’ is not mandatory literature anymore. <img src='http://crowmoor.se/blog/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_wink.gif' alt=';-)' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
<p>Looking at the possibilities of Compliance as a service I started to look at BCM, Business Contingency Management. One of my colleagues, Hans Hjertsäll, excels in that standard and I challenged him if it was possible to do. After a few minutes thought we started analyse it and I a matter of hours we found possibilities to create it as a service. The biggest challenge is of course that BCM, as opposed to PCI DSS, needs to be involved in all levels in the organisation from top management downwards. Having consultants everywhere will both be expensive and problematic as many firms tend to be volatile in their approach. However, with a sound framework, it is possible do put in a set of services for handling BCP testing, planning, workshops to create plans and so on. So after a few hours’ work I was tasked to create the plan for how such services should be implemented and delivered, something that have taken me an awful lot of hours but is finally done. Welcome BCM as a service! (and a number of British consultants will most possibly start to hate me even more now). ;-</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?feed=rss2&#038;p=422</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Is PCI DSS as a Service possible?</title>
		<link>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=415</link>
		<comments>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=415#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 09:59:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jesper Kråkhede</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Business]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=415</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Starting your own company is always an interesting challenge, especially when you have ideas that are not so common in the industry. Our core service is PCI DSS as a service, sounds simple enough? Quite a few clients have been intrigued what it actually means and how to implement it. PCI DSS as a service [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Starting your own company is always an interesting challenge, especially when you have ideas that are not so common in the industry. Our core service is PCI DSS as a service, sounds simple enough? Quite a few clients have been intrigued what it actually means and how to implement it. </p>
<p>PCI DSS as a service is in essence a concept where we use our PCI DSS reference architecture to map where the client currently is in the compliance process and how well the requirements are fulfilled. The GAP analysis, that is the outcome, gives us the information needed to provide a roadmap how to minimise the PCI DSS scope and what kind of services that is needed to become PCI DSS compliant. A couple of the services are log management, incident response, CIAAS (compliant infrastructure as a service) to name a few. The goal for us is to help the client to become compliant with as little effort as possible without compromising the overall security. </p>
<p>So PCI DSS as a service is mainly a tightly controlled infrastructure paired with all the services needed to fulfil all PCI DSS requirements. This could be delivered either as a cloud service that we provide, as an in-house service if the client wants to have control over the infrastructure or as a concept for those that wants to run it by themselves but would like to have a streamlined and secure setup that is easy to maintain.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?feed=rss2&#038;p=415</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Coresafe</title>
		<link>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=410</link>
		<comments>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=410#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Jan 2012 21:07:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jesper Kråkhede</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Business]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=410</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[After 9.5 years I have decided to leave Capgemini and try my wings in an own company. The 1th of January I and Hans Hjertsäll together with Ekelöw, a company within the information security business, started Coresafe. We will focus on compliance and security architecture delivering turnkey ready PCI DSS infrastructure that is cloud based. [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After 9.5 years I have decided to leave Capgemini and try my wings in an own company. The 1th of January I and Hans Hjertsäll together with Ekelöw, a company within the information security business, started Coresafe. We will focus on compliance and security architecture delivering turnkey ready PCI DSS infrastructure that is cloud based. </p>
<p>But I will still of course blog here twice a month. I enjoy it and hope you are too.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?feed=rss2&#038;p=410</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Buying a new car</title>
		<link>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=406</link>
		<comments>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=406#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 31 Dec 2011 22:59:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jesper Kråkhede</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Security Architecture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crowmoor.se/blog/?p=406</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Having a large family puts a constraint on available cars on the market. Not all cars will let seven grownups, teens and kids ride comfortable. Having that said I started to look around and eventually found a car that was just what I needed. When starting to discuss the car with the dealer I experienced [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Having a large family puts a constraint on available cars on the market. Not all cars will let seven grownups, teens and kids ride comfortable. Having that said I started to look around and eventually found a car that was just what I needed. When starting to discuss the car with the dealer I experienced a funny thing. For the first time ever I understood more about the inner working than he did. No, I haven’t read more about cars; I just know quite a lot of stuff in electronics and computers. </p>
<p>I created a presentation with a few colleagues a few months ago we named: How about an unstealable car? We took a modern car with all its gadgets and computers and applied Jericho Style Security on it. I can´t say that it is possible to build but it sure was an interesting experience to see that Jericho holds true even if applied to everyday objects, not only it-systems.</p>
<p>Going back to the poor car dealer, I asked him several questions regarding internal communication, possibility to access the onboard computers and so on…I got the car quite a few €100´s cheaper.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://crowmoor.se/blog/?feed=rss2&#038;p=406</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>

